[interviewed yesterday on WAMC's Midday Magazine re: effort to preserve lever voting machines!...see:
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/wamc/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=1633784 ]
[new here below-- information < Johnson Controls Account Executive Chris Kalwara re: energy audits]
[new (scroll down)-- letters of support for these resolutions from Hudson Valley Area Labor Federation Coordinator Sue Delgiorno, Columbia County Democratic Elections Commissioner Virginia Martin,
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids NYS Director Meredith Wiley-- more reason for you all to speak up today!]
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Hi all...
If you can, please come out and speak up today for five initiatives from yours truly to get out of various committees (embraced by most if not all of our County Legislature's Dem caucus)-- for a youth leadership summit, a public jobs summit (with business, labor, academia, taxpayers), making cost-saving investments in our children, keeping lever voting machines, and protecting family farmers!...
[numbers count; speak on these today on 6th floor of our County Office Building at 22 Market St. in Pok.]
[can't make it?...it's still not too late to email all of us on these: countylegislators@co.dutchess.ny.us!]
[full agenda here: http://www.co.dutchess.ny.us/CountyGov/Departments/Legislature/CLagenda.htm ; click on green resolution numbers to download texts of resolutions and for times of committee meetings]
4:15 PM Family and Human Services Committee
2010082 Requesting Dutchess County Youth Bureau work with high school student governments to create a Youth Leadership summit
[Poughkeepsie High School Student Government Advisor (and former Co. Leg.) Rick Keller-Coffey has told us he's interested in helping us make this happen; GOP leg.'s Rolison and Traudt are co-sponsoring this, along with Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, White-- speak up to add bipartisan support!]
[yes-- we'll try to pull this off even if this resolution is killed by GOP today-- but easier w/county support]
5:15 PM Budget, Finance, and Personnel Committee
2010093 Dutchess County Legislature conduct public jobs summit
Summit to hear input from public, business leaders, labor, local academia, etc. to be held within 60 days
[Marist Bureau of Economic Research's Ann Davis, Vassar Economics Dept.'s Paul Ruud, and Rhinebeck Chamber of Commerce's Nancy Amy have all told us they're interested in this-- and John MacEnroe of our county's Economic Development Corporation, Mike Tomkavich of our county's Industrial Development Agency, and Ann Meagher of the Greater Southern Dutchess Chamber of Commerce have all also told us they'd gladly participate in such a summit if the resolution passes;
thx tons to Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, White for co-sponsorin' this one I drafted]
[yes-- will be organizing this event regardless of whether GOP in Co. Leg. vote yes...but hope they will]
6:00 PM Public Safety Committee
2010104 Requesting Federal and State Government to help implement the Fight Crime: Invest in Kids program
Four-part plan to cut crime and violence.
[see: http://www.fightcrime.org/state/new-york ; even Sheriff Butch Anderson, DA Bill Grady part of this;
thx tons to Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, White, Kelsey for co-sponsorin' this one I drafted; according to FCIK NYS Director Meredith Wiley, North Carolina and Minnesota have been much better than NYS over time re: early childhood programs, and "Missouri is stellar on Juvenile Justice" in comparison to New York; FCIK's recent report on Juvenile Justice also refers on p. 22 to innovative programs in NYC on this to reduce unnecessary incarceration; Florida's Juvenile Justice initiative is also model for NYS]
6:15 PM Environment Committee
2010110 Resolution in support of the U.S. Dept of Justice's investigation of the impact of the consolidation of farm economy on the farmers and community
Urges the Dept of Justice to restore competition to the farm economy.
[see: http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2009-12-14-monsanto-practices_N.htm ; thx tons to Goldberg, Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, Doxsey for co-sponsorin' this one I drafted]
6:30 PM Government Services & Administration Committee
2010112 Joining the lawsuit with other counties to declare the state's Election Reform and Modernization Act of 2005 unconstitutional
Joining the lawsuit as long as it is done at no cost to the taxpayers.
[both Dem and GOP Dutchess Elections Commissioners Fran Knapp and David Gamache have told us they are not opposed to this lawsuit
[see: http://www.ETCNYS.org http://www.ElectionTransparencyCoalition.org
[thx tons to Goldberg, Kuffner, Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, Kelsey for co-sponsorin' this one I drafted]
So-- hope to see y'all up there on sixth floor of 22 Market St. in Pok. speaking up for these, folks!...
[...again-- can't make it?...zip off letter to all 25 of us on these: countylegislators@co.dutchess.ny.us...]
Pass it on!...
Joel
242-3571/876-2488
joeltyner@earthlink.net
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Two Years Later Dutchess County Buildings Getting Energy Audits-- But At What Price?
[recall original email sent out to this list on this Mar. 12th-- but check out new info here < J. Controls!]
Feel free to contact Johnson Controls Account Executive Chris Kalwara at (315) 431-7723 or kalwara@jci.com re: resolution 2010083 for energy audits for county buildings (scroll down to bottom of this email to see resolution I got passed in our County Legislature 14-11 in April 2008 for no-cost energy audits of county buildings that all 11 GOP voted no to 2 years ago; my how times change...lol)...
Kalwara shared with us earlier this week that the $500,000 reported in last Friday's Poughkeepsie Journal to be "used to assess buildings and analyze what could be improved"-- "seems extremely high to me", according to Kalwara...
Kalwara also reminded us that Johnson Controls offered Dutchess County back in the spring of 2008 no-cost, no-obligation, preliminary assessments of all county-owned buildings here in Dutchess County-- for free, without costing the taxpayers of our county a penny-- to identify potential cost savings and energy conservation measures...
Kalwara also pointed out to us that when the engineering firm that performs such audits is not the eventual firm that does the work, that it is much less likely that that same firm will be held fast to keep to the numbers it projected for energy savings-- unlike what would happen with Johnson Controls...
To this point-- I, along with the rest of his colleagues in the County Legislature, received a memo Mar. 11th from Roman Yasiejko, R.A., Director of Physical Facilities, stating that, "Dutchess County has selected two teams consisting of architects, engineers and energy consultants. The two teams are Swartz Architectural Group and Erdman Anthony Associates, and Robert A. Marrapodi Architecture and Steven Winter Associates. These two teams will provide comprehensive building assessments and energy audits for these County facilities"...
[today: http://www.dutchessny.gov/CountyGov/Departments/Legislature/ResolutionsPDF/2010083.pdf ]
[recall last Friday's Poughkeepsie Journal article on this:
http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/article/20100402/NEWS01/4020323/Dutchess-says-2.3-million-grant-can-help-save-energy ]
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Check out these three links for even more reason why we need to fight to keep lever machines:
"Computer Scientists Agree: Software-Based Systems Cannot Be Made Secure from Undetectable Manipulation or Error" [Election Transparency Coalition (Andi Novick and Joanne Lukacher)]
http://electiontransparencycoalition.org/chart/resources-background-links/faqs/computer-scientists-agree-software-based-election-systems-cannot-be-made-secure-from-undetectable-manipulation-or-error/
HBO documentary: "Hacking Democracy"
http://www.HackingDemocracy.com
"Diebold Hack Hints at Wider Flaws [in Optical Scan Voting Machines" by Kim Zetter [Wired 12/05]
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/12/69893
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From Dutchess County Dem Elections Commissioner Fran Knapp (fknapp@co.dutchess.ny.us)...
Subject: pricing for ballots
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2010 13:23:15 -0400
Right now the bid for printing optical scan voting machine ballots is about .57 per ballot. The State requires us to print 110% of total voter enrollment which looks like about 200,000 ballots. We hope to cover 95% of the cost this year and maybe some next year through HAVA grants but that is a one time grant. The county will be responsible after any HAVA money has been spent.
We also must store in a climate controlled warehouse all ballots for 22 months.
Hope this helps.
Fran Knapp
Democratic Commissioner
DC Board of Elections
(845) 486-2473
fknapp@co.dutchess.ny.us
...and when I asked Fran K. whether storage for optical scan voting systems is more or less expensive than traditional lever voting machines, she responded as follows:
Much more expensive because you have to have a certain temperature at all times.
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From Hudson Valley Area Labor Federation Coordinator Sue DelGiorno (sdelgiorno@hvalf.org>)...
To: countylegislators@co.dutchess.ny.us
Subject: In Re: Jobs Summit Resolution
Date: Apr 7, 2010 9:36 PM
As you all know, the current economic climate is failing many working families throughout the country. Dutchess County families are not excluded, many of which are feeling the effects of the downturn worst of all. Although official statistics claim that February's unemployment rate in Dutchess was 8.3%, this number fails to take into account underemployment. In fact, a very recent Gallup Poll found that the U.S. underemployment rate rose to 20.3% in March, while nationally, unemployment remained at 9.7%. You can therefore imagine that a much larger percentage of workers in Dutchess are struggling to get by.
Being unemployed is a stressful, uneasy, and, at times, depressing situation that can break both the spirits of families and the thread that holds those families together. But creating a jobs summit can provide an initial step in affording workers in Dutchess County the opportunity to discuss how to improve not only their working lives, but their quality of life as well. Creating a dialogue between our elected officials, businesses, organized labor, and those who are feeling the effects of this downturn the most, will open a community forum through which ideas will be created and hopes renewed. In addition, this dialogue will help us to understand how and why the economy is where it is, where we can go from here, and what we can do in the future to prevent another terrible downturn.
We commend Legislator Tyner for proposing this resolution, and Legislators Jeter-Jackson, MacAvery, and White for co-sponsoring it. There are many Dutchess County legislators who have fought for jobs and continue to do so, and working families greatly appreciate their efforts. We urge you to continue to fight to assist Dutchess working families in showing compassion for, and understanding of, their struggles.
Respectfully,
Susan DelGiorno, Coordinator
Hudson Valley Area Labor Federation
P.O. Box 10663
Newburgh, NY 12552
(845)567-7760
http://www.HVALF.org
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From Fight Crime: Invest in Kids NYS Director Meredith Wiley (mwiley@fightcrime.org):
To: countylegislators@co.dutchess.ny.us
Subject: letter of support for invest in kids resolution
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2010 13:35:16 -0400
April 7, 2010
Dutchess County Legislators
Poughkeepsie, New York
Dear Sirs;
As a national organization of more than 5000 police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, and other law enforcement leader, and violence survivors, including 284 from New York, we are determined to see that dangerous criminals are put behind bars. But we know that putting criminals in jail does not solve the crime problem at its core.
Our members recognize that the most powerful weapon against crime is to invest in proven programs that help kids get the right start in life and keep them on track to becoming productive and law-abiding citizens. Our mission is to identify those programs that have a strong research evaluation that prove they work and educate policy makers on the best of what we know works. We have developed a four-part Youth and School Violence Prevention Plan that is grounded in this research to support early home visitation, high quality early care and education, after-school and intervention programs proven to help troubled kids get back on track. (attached)
We appreciate your efforts to pass a Dutchess County Resolution recognizing the value of our Crime Prevention Plan, and calling upon state and federal government to use these ideals to guide policy decisions that will affect the lives of children and the safety of our communities both now and in the future.
Thank you for introducing this Resolution and thank you for your leadership in this effort. We look forward to partnering together with the Dutchess County Legislature in the future to make our communities safer through quality investments in kids.
Sincerely,
Meredith Wiley, JP, MPA
State Director
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Eight Facts from Nassau County's Lawsuit To Preserve Lever Voting Machines in NYS:
Fact #1: The New York State Court of Appeals has recently observed that "the technology is not foolproof, however, and the optical scan voting machine is sometimes unable to record the votes identified on the ballot for various reasons, including deviation by the voter of the recommended manner of marking the boxes on the form, causing some ballots to be rejected as unreadable."
[Stewart v. Chautauqua County Board of Elections, et. al., 2010 NY Slip Op 01530, at 10 (2010)]
[see: http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I10_0038.htm ]
Fact #2: A 2006 report commissioned by California's Secretary of State found that optical scanners can be attacked without detection: "There would be no way to know that any of these attacks occurred; the canvass procedure would not detect any anomalies, and would just produce incorrect results. The only way to detect and correct the problem would be by recount of the original paper ballots."
http://www.gouverneurtimes.com/worldnational-news/54-worldnational-news/10625-easily-hacked-voting-systems-to-be-used-in-ma-special-election-for-the-us-senate.html
Fact #3: In 2006, the University of Connecticut published its assessment of the ease with which election results can be falsified on an optical scanner: "An Accu-Vote Optical Scan can be compromised with off-the-shelf equipment in a matter of minutes even if the machine has its removable memory card sealed in place. The basic attack can be applied to effect a variety of results, including entirely neutralizing one candidate so that their votes are not counted, swapping the votes of two candidates, or biasing the results by shifting some votes from one candidate to the other...Such vote tabulation corruptions can lay dormant until Election Day, thus avoiding detection through pre-election tests...Voters could be unaware of any discrepancies between their cast votes and the internally recorded votes."
[see: http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0796.htm ]
Fact #4: In July 2007, a report commissioned by Florida's Secretary of State found that optical scanners could be subverted without detection. With only brief access to a machine, someone can replace a memory card with one preprogrammed to read one candidate's votes as counting for another. "The attack can be carried out with a reasonably low probability of detection..."
[see: http://www.wheresthepaper.org/DecLukacher.pdf ]
Fact #5: The July 2007 Florida SAIT study also detailed how an optical scanner could be exploited to compromise election results: "Flaws in the Optical Scan software enable an unofficial memory card to be inserted into an active terminal. Such a card can be preprogrammed to swap the electronically tabulated votes for two candidates, reroute all of a candidate's votes to a different candidate, or tabulate votes for several candidates of choice toward a different candidate."
[see: http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2007-fsusait-2/index.html ]
Fact #6: In December 2007, Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner released her Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards, and Testing (EVEREST) study, which showed that memory cards in optical scanners could be disabled without the software indicating a problem.
http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2007/12/1000-pages-of-bad-news-ohio-e-voting-report-released.ars
Fact #7: Computer scientist Harry Hursti, who subverted the zero count on an optical scanner, concluded that corrupted optical scanners could survive "scrutiny of almost anything short of a full manual recount." Hursti also demonstrated how in a one-step process the EMS central tabulator's accuracy and safeguard could be easily subverted so as to "modify the election results reports so that they do not match actual vote data...produce false optical scan reports to facilitate checks and balances...and mimic votes from many precincts at once while transmitting votes to the central tabulator."
[see: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/12/69893 ]
Fact #8: In 2008, a "red-team" was commissioned by the California Secretary of State to conduct an in-depth analysis of optical voting terminals, and the ES&S Unity 3.0.1.1 Voting System in particular (a similar version to the EMS software certified for use in New York). The team revealed more than a dozen attacks exploiting vulnerabilities at the cryptographic level, the removal media, the EMS, and in the voting terminal, including forging audit logs in the EMS.
[see: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/unity_3011_red_team.pdf ]
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From Columbia County Board of Elections Democratic Commissioner Virginia Martin (vmartin@govt.co.columbia.ny.us)...
To: joeltyner@earthlink.net
Subject: for your meeting tomorrow
Date: Apr 7, 2010 3:38 PM
Attachments: 2010 ColCountyLeverMachResolution.pdf
Dear Joel:
At our Board of Supervisors meeting next week on the 14th, I expect the board to pass a resolution authorizing Columbia County, the Columbia County Board of Elections, and its Election Commissioners to join the Nassau County suit challenging the constitutionality of the Election Reform Modernization Act of 2005 and requesting leave to delay the deployment of optical-scan voting machines until the Fall of 2011 at the earliest.
At our County Government Committee's March meeting, a related resolution was passed, and I expect that it, too, will be passed by the full board next week. This also requests leave to delay optical-scan implementation until at least 2011. That resolution is attached.
I urge Dutchess County to join the Nassau County litigation. There are no rights more fundamental to democracy than the rights to vote and to have one's vote counted as cast, and these rights are guaranteed only when the public's right to observe every step of the election process is protected. All of these rights ensure the integrity and accuracy of our elections, and they have been and continue to be afforded voters by the lever voting machines and the ballot-marking devices that have been employed at our elections. The tabulating function of electronic-voting-machine technology strips the voters of these rights.
Thank you for your important efforts in this regard.
Virginia
Virginia Martin_Democratic Commissioner_Board of Elections, Columbia County_401 State Street, Hudson, New York 12534_Tel: 518-828-3115_Fax: 518-828-2624
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Again-- from the Election Transparency Coalition-- read this all the way thru and pass it along to all!...
Computer scientists agree: software-based election systems cannot be made secure from undetectable manipulation or error
http://electiontransparencycoalition.org/chart/resources-background-links/faqs/computer-scientists-agree-software-based-election-systems-cannot-be-made-secure-from-undetectable-manipulation-or-error/
Since 2002, when HAVA was enacted, computer scientists have released over three dozen studies of the software-based voting systems rushed in by HAVA. Every one of these studies has concluded that software-based optical scanners and DREs (direct record electronic systems, often known as "touch screens") are vulnerable to undetectable manipulation and error. While any machine, including a lever voting machine, can be hacked, software enables a single individual to change thousands of votes in a few minutes without leaving a trace.
The inner workings of the software-based machine are invisible. Systematic exploits enable massive vote switching in minutes. In contrast, to affect the outcome of an election conducted with lever machines is labor-intensive since each machine must be individually rigged, increasing the likelihood that the crime would be caught; levers are not capable of systematic exploits. Vote flipping, common on electronic machines, is also not possible on a lever machine. Tampering to a lever machine can be detected because the working parts of the lever machine are visible, as contrasted with software, which is invisible to all but the programmers. Regardless of how the software has been programmed, self-erasing malware can be introduced into an electronic system but not into a lever system. Certification of computerized systems is a ruse because no amount of certification testing will make voting computers secure.
* The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Federal government's own technical advisers, found that certification testing cannot provide security or reliability:
[E]xperience in testing software and systems has shown that testing to high degrees of security and reliability is from a practical perspective not possible." (Emphasis added.)
* A 2007 report authorized by the California Secretary of State found that with software-based voting machines:
An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual with temporary access to a single voting machine. The damage could be extensive - malicious code could spread to every voting machine in polling places and to county election servers.
* Finding error or fraud in software code has been shown to be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming due to self-erasing code and the fact that code can be several hundred thousand lines in length, according to the 2008 ACCURATE Report (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections):
[N]o matter how hard one looks for errors or faults in voting system software, there is no way to guarantee that one has found them all. Even if no errors or faults are found, there is no way to guarantee that none existŠ.
* Notwithstanding the pre-election certification of the optical scanners and even with security seals in place, in 2006 the University of Connecticut established how easily election results can be falsified on an optical scanner:
An Accu-Vote Optical Scan can be compromised with off-the-shelf equipment in a matter of minutes even if the machine has its removable memory card sealed in place. The basic attack can be applied to effect a variety of results, including entirely neutralizing one candidate so that their votes are not counted, swapping the votes of two candidates, or biasing the results by shifting some votes from one candidate to anotherŠ.
Such vote tabulation corruptions can lay dormant until Election Day, thus avoiding detection through pre-election testsŠ. [V]oters could be unaware of any discrepancies between their cast votes and the internally recorded votes.
* A 2007 Florida report demonsrated how viruses can be introduced and propagated from a single machine to every other computer in the jurisdiction as well as from one election to the next. Each county will use an Election Management System (EMS) computer (commonly known as a "central tabulator"). The central tabulator reprograms the optical scanners before every election using a memory card that tells the machine who is on the ballot and how to count it, and then accumulates and reports precinct-level results after an election. Florida's study demonstrated how a virus introduced to a single machine would spread to every other machine in the county via memory cards:
A cleverly constructed virus can cover its tracks so that infected machines could not be detected by ordinary means and an appropriately programmed virus could self-destruct and erase all its tracksŠ. [I]f carefully constructed, it can allow an attacker to transfer program control to her own malicious code. Once this happens, the attacker controls the machine.
* A 2006 Princeton University report "describes how the virus propagates Š via memory cards, without requiring any network." NY's wireless ban would not prevent this massive attack because all computers in a county communicate with the EMS central tabulator, which in turn communicates with each computer in the county:
An infected machine will infect any memory card that is inserted into it. An infected memory card will infect any machine that is powered up or rebooted with the memory card inserted. Because cards are transferred between machines during vote counting and administrative activities, the infected population will grow over time.
* A 2006 report commissioned by California's Secretary of State corroborated that these attacks to optical scanners cannot be discerned by election officials responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the election:
There would be no way to know that any of these attacks occurred; the canvass procedure would not detect any anomalies, and would just produce incorrect results. The only way to detect and correct the problem would be by recount of the original paper ballots.
* A 2007 report commissioned by Florida's Secretary of State reaffirmed that election results could be readily compromised by an individual with only brief access to an optical scanner, by replacing the memory card with one preprogrammed to read one candidate's votes as counting for another. The report also found "The attack can be carried out with a reasonably low probability of detectionŠ."
Flaws in the Optical Scan software enable an unofficial memory card to be inserted into an active terminal. Such a card can be preprogrammed to swap the electronically tabulated votes for two candidates, reroute all of a candidate's votes to a different candidate, or tabulate votes for several candidates of choice toward a different candidate.
* In 2007, Ohio's Secretary of State released the Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards and Testing (EVEREST) study, which revealed, among other things, the ineffectiveness of requirements -such as NY's - that the source code be escrowed to secure the software. The EVEREST team was able to penetrate all of Ohio's voting systems, including Sequoia's optical scanner, without the source code. None of these attacks could have been detected or prevented by knowing the source code. The EVEREST report concluded that software-based systems are "insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election."
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